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Abstract
Self-organized networks require some mechanism to ensure cooperation and fairness.
A promising approach is the use of decentralized reputation systems. However, their
vulnerability to liars has not yet been analyzed in detail.
In this paper, we provide a first step to the robustness analysis of a reputation
system based on a deviation test. Users accept second hand information only if
this does not differ too much from their reputation values. We simplify the original
system in order to obtain a one-dimensional formulation and show that it exhibits a
phase transition. In the subcritical regime, the reputation system is robust. In the
supercritical regime, lying has an impact. We obtain the critical values via a mean-
field approach and verify the results by explicit computation. Thus, we provide
conditions for the deviation test to make the reputation system robust as well as
quantitative results on what goes wrong in the supercritical regime.
1 Introduction
Decentralized systems such as Peer-to-Peer Resource Sharing Networks have recently
become more popular, both in practice and research. Novel communication systems
that are being considered, such as Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, are designed to be
self-organized so as to achieve minimal administrative and operational costs.
In most applications users are individuals that are primarily interested in their
own benefit. However, for a decentralized network to function, its users need to
contribute in some form or other to the services of the system without getting any
immediate reward. Thus, there is a natural incentive for users to only consume, but
not contribute. Cooperation and fairness cannot be guaranteed. This behaviour
is called free-riding and is a well-known phenomenon in economics. In the context
of Peer-To-Peer Networks, for example, it has been demonstrated in a number of
measurement studies [1, 2, 3]. Network performance can be seriously deteriorated.
One possible approach to the free-rider problem is to introduce pricing schemes [4]
into the system in order to create the right incentives for the users. For example, see
[5] and [6]. Alternatively, contribution rules [7] and, more recently, artificial immune
systems are being considered [8].
Another idea is that of a reputation system. Here, users keep track of their peers’
behaviour and exchange this information with others. Each user merges his own first
hand information with the second hand information he receives in order to compute
a reputation value about each of his peers. Users with a good reputation are then
favoured. A popular example of a reputation mechanism is the rating used in EBAY
[9]. However, this is a centralized mechanism as the ratings are handled by the EBAY
server. By contrast, the applications we have in mind are fully decentralized and
self-organized. No trusted third party can be assumed. Reputation systems do not
distinguish between different causes for misbehaviour. By contrast, pricing or rules
mainly address selfish users, but not malicious or faulty behaviour.
The advantage of a reputation system over merely using first hand information is
two-fold. Firstly, an accurate estimate of some subject’s behaviour can be obtained
faster. Secondly, a user can have a reputation value about a subject without ever
1
having interacted with it himself. However, an inherent problem with any such mech-
anism is the vulnerability to liars. Some user might have an interest in spreading
false information, so naively believing all second hand information is problematic.
Reputation values must be accurate at least to some degree.
A simple idea to address this problem was suggested originally in the context of
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks by Buchegger and Le Boudec [10]. Here, a user believes
second hand information only if it does not differ too much from the user’s reputation
value. This is called the deviation test. In fact, the system considered in [10] is more
complex. It also allows for using second hand information from trusted peers. To
this end, each user maintains both a reputation and a trust value about each of
his peers. Both are updated using a modified Bayesian approach. As opposed to
reputation, trust values are based on compatibility and thus indicate agreement.
The system appears to work well. So far, however, performance has only been
evaluated through simulations of a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network with a particular set of
assumptions (e.g. on the routing protocol). In personal communication the authors
reported further simulations suggesting that the deviation test on its own without
the trust component nearly performs as well. It seems surprising that such a simple
idea works so well and we consider it worth analyzing in more detail and in a more
general context. This is the aim of our research.
In this paper, we provide the first step by analyzing a simplified model for the
case of 2 users, one honest and the other a liar. The model simplifies the reputation
counters in order to obtain a one-dimensional system which is easier to analyze. The
precise modeling assumptions are listed in Section 3.1 and the model is formulated
in Section 3.2. We provide mean-field results in Section 4 and verify them by means
of direct computation for certain parameter sets in Section 5. We thus show that
the system exhibits a phase transition. That is, there is a threshold rate of lying
below which the reputation value of the honest user remains unaffected. Above it,
the lying will have an impact and corrupt the reputation system.
Note that the idea of a deviation test is a very natural one. In a social network
of acquaintances humans are likely to disbelieve information that, to them, seem
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highly unlikely. At least, if they have no means of verifying it themselves. As such,
the results are of interest in the context of social sciences also.
2 Related Work
A number of reputation mechanisms have been suggested and studied. However, to
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first analytical approach to evaluate a
reputation system.
A selection of references focusing on decentralized reputation systems is given below.
Further references can be found therein.
Michiardi and Molva propose the collaborative reputation mechanism CORE [11].
The CONFIDANT Protocol was introduced by Buchegger and Le Boudec [12].
Aberer and Despotovic [13] suggest a mechanism for P-Grid, a Peer-To-Peer system,
that spreads negative information only. Collaboration enforcement in Peer-To-Peer
systems has also been considered by Moreton and Twigg [14]. Carbone et al. [15]
introduce a formal model for trust in dynamic networks. Jurca and Faltings [16]
and Fernandes et al. [17] consider incentives for truthful reporting itself. The reader
is referred to [18] for the EigenTrust algorithm, a method to compute global trust
values in the presence of pre-trusted peers.
3 Model
3.1 Modeling Assumptions
Subject Behaviour
We study the case when there is a single subject whose reputation is considered. Its
actual behaviour is assumed to be either positive or negative with probabilities θ and
1 − θ respectively. Thus, when a user interacts with the subject itself it observes
positive behaviour with probability θ and negative behaviour otherwise. This is
assumed to be independent of all other observations. Hence the actual behaviour is
represented by the parameter θ, a real number in [0, 1].
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Note that this subject is not necessarily one of the N users themselves. Alternatively,
users of the network might be interested in the behaviour of some external subject.
In the context of a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network, for example, this might be the provider
of an external service such as Internet access. Our model captures this case as well.
The more practical case when there are M subjects of interest can be decomposed
into M instances of our model. The M sets of reputation values do not interfere
with each other and can be considered independently. In particular, if we take N
subjects, one for each user, the model corresponds to the scenario described in the
introduction.
Reputation
There are N users 1, 2, . . . , N , with corresponding reputation values Ri(t) about the
subject. These are also real numbers in [0, 1] and reflect the belief that user i has
about θ at time t. This opinion might change with new observations, arising either
from interactions with the subject itself or with a peer.
A direct observation is an observation of the subject’s behaviour. The collection
of direct observations constitutes a user’s first hand information. An indirect ob-
servation arises from interactions with peers who report about their own direct
observations. The collection of indirect observations is the second hand information
available to the user.
Direct observations are always accepted and the reputation values updated accord-
ingly. Indirect observations are only accepted if the reported observation does not
deviate too far from the current opinion Ri(t). This deviation test is controlled by
the parameter ∆ in (0, 1).
Interaction Model
The interaction model describes how users interact with the subject and their peers.
We shall assume that each user i makes direct observations at the points of a Poisson
process in time, at rate µi. Interactions of user i with j (such that i receives second
hand information from j) occur according to a Poisson process with rate λij. All
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processes are assumed to be independent.
In all applications the interaction pattern is influenced by the call model or some
model of the users activity. In mobile applications, it is further influenced by the
mobility model. Although the interaction pattern might differ between applications,
the model above is a natural one to examine.
Adversary Model
One needs to make precise assumptions on the adversary’s abilities in order to give
performance guarantees. We shall assume that liars follow the plain strategy to
always lie maximally, i.e. they will always report either extremely negative or ex-
tremely positive behaviour about the subject when interacting with their peers.
They do so in attempt to achieve maximal impact. It suffices to focus on the ex-
tremely negative part, as the other one is similar by symmetry. The adversary model
can be gradually extended to capture more sophisticated attacks on the reputation
system.
Performance
A reputation system works well if good nodes in the network benefit from it and bad
nodes do not, or at least not as much. We claim that this can be achieved by suitable
reaction mechanisms based on the reputation values, provided that these values are
accurate. The faster users can obtain accurate estimates, the better the system will
work, but there is a fundamental trade-off between robustness and speed. We shall
assess robustness in detail. It will then be possible to choose parameters such that
the system will be as fast as possible subject to being accurate.
Further Assumptions
We first consider the case of one honest user and one liar. The honest user makes
direct observations at rate µ = µ1 = 1 and indirect ones originating from the liar
at rate λ = λ12 > 0. Define p = µ/(µ + λ) = 1/(1 + λ). Then, at each step, the
observation is direct with probability p and indirect with probability 1−p. Notation
is summarized in Table 1.
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Note that there is a close relationship between the case of two peers only and the
general case. We can focus on one out of the honest users by symmetry. Several
liars can be considered as one by aggregating their influence. This can be accounted
for by increasing λ for the one liar. In fact, it looks like ignoring the other honest
ones could be accounted for by increasing µ, but this will have to be investigated in
more detail (cf. Section 6).
3.2 Model Formulation
A natural scheme, motivated by the reputation system suggested in [10] and other
proposals, is to keep a history of prior events, that is a count of positive and negative
observations. Thus we are led to consider the following two-dimensional process
zn = (xn, yn) for n ≥ 0.
(xn+1, yn+1) = ρ(xn, yn) +


(1, 0) w.p. pθ
(0, 1) w.p. p(1− θ)
(0, ω)1{xn/(xn+yn)≤∆} w.p. 1− p
(1)
Essentially, the first component keeps track of positive observations and the second
component keeps track of negative observations. Direct observations are counted
with 1, indirect observations are weighted by ω > 0. Moreover, we discount both
components individually with a discount factor 0 < ρ < 1, typically very close to
1. We want discounting in the model to be able to track changing behaviour. The
initial conditions are z0 = (x0, y0).
The quantity we are interested in is Rn = xn/(xn + yn), the proportion of positive
observations of the total number of observations that the honest peer collects during
the first n events. We examine how well this compares to the true θ, that is the
actual proportion of positive behaviour of the subject in question.
Rewriting the two-dimensional formulation above in terms of Rn gives an expression
that depends on the unknown xn + yn. However, assuming ω = 1 and replacing the
neutral increment (0, 0) with the also neutral (xn/(xn +yn), yn/(xn +yn)) in the case
of a rejection from the deviation test, the sum xn + yn increases deterministically
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by 1 at each step and xn + yn can be determined from the starting value (x0, y0).
Rn+1 = Rn +
1
ρ(xn + yn) + 1


(1−Rn) w.p. pθ
−Rn w.p. p(1− θ)
−Rn1{Rn≤∆} w.p. 1− p
(2)
Taking (x0, y0) with x0 + y0 = 1/(1− ρ) we know that xn + yn = 1/(1− ρ) for all n.
Hence we have the following, simpler formulation for Rn = R
1(tn) where tn is the
time of the nth interaction.
Rn+1 = Rn + (1− ρ)


(1−Rn) w.p. pθ
−Rn w.p. p(1− θ)
−Rn1{Rn≤∆} w.p. 1− p
(3)
Starting with such a value is in fact reasonable. We would like to account for the case
when behaviour might change over time. But then, if such a change occurs after the
system has been running for some time, we would start from a state (x, y) that nearly
satisfies x + y = 1/(1 − ρ). However, there would be no a priori knowledge of the
change, so we could not simply reset the system to an arbitrary starting value. So,
we take the state at time 0 to be a ‘fully converged’ state with x0 + y0 = 1/(1− ρ).
We can thus describe it by r0, meaning
1
1−ρ
(r0, 1 − r0). Again, see Table 1 for a
summary of the notation.
The process is a homogeneous Markov Chain with the state space a subset of the
interval [0, 1]. For rational parameters, it will take rational values only and the state
space is countable, although, complicated.
Note that we have lost a degree of freedom by assuming ω = 1. It is reasonable to
expect, however, that the important quantity is the product ωλ, so in this respect
we do not lose generality. Moreover, one can consider a generalization of (3) which
corresponds to a certain projection onto the line {(x, y) : x + y = 1/(1− ρ)} in (1).
The advantage of formulation (3) is that it is one-dimensional, so computing the
distribution of Rn is tractable (cf. Section 5).
Although we have defined the process in order to estimate θ it does not converge
to a constant. Neither with probability 1, nor in Lp, nor in probability. This is
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because, for all times n, there is positive probability that the next state takes either
one of two values which differ by a constant. However, for convergence, we would
need this difference to become arbitrarily small. This lack of convergence is due to
the discounting which we require to allow for tracking of behaviour that changes
over time. Another advantage will become apparent later on (cf. Section 5). So,
we assess convergence (in distribution) to some limiting distribution from which we
infer θ.
4 Mean-Field Approach
4.1 Zero Drift Values
We shall first determine the values of R satisfying R = ER′. These ‘zero drift values’
are solutions to
R = R + (1− ρ)


pθ − pR if R > ∆
pθ − pR− (1− p)R if R ≤ ∆.
(4)
Thus, R = θ is a solution if and only if θ > ∆. R = pθ is a solution if and only if
pθ ≤ ∆.
Phrased in terms of λ we obtain the following: If θ > ∆, there is the truthful zero
drift value R = θ. For λ < λc = (θ −∆)/∆ it is unique. Otherwise, there exists a
second, false value R = pθ. If θ ≤ ∆ then the latter, false zero drift value is unique.
Furthermore, it is easy to check that the drift at other values is towards these zero
drift values. The further away, the stronger the drift. In the case of two zero drift
values, the change of drift occurs at R = ∆. A graphical interpretation of the results
is thus that θ and pθ are zero drift values only if they are above and below of ∆
respectively.
Comparison with the invariant distribution of a Birth-and-Death chain (cf. [19])
with suitably chosen transition probabilities suggests that a single zero drift value
maximizes the distribution, i.e. is the most likely state. Thus, what we can expect is
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convergence of Rn (in distribution) to a limiting distribution which exhibits a phase
transition in terms of the number of modes.
4.2 Mean Ordinary Differential Equation
Our formulation (3) can be written in stochastic approximation form. For a com-
prehensive reference see Kushner and Yin [20]. The basic paradigm is a stochastic
difference equation where one recursively adjusts the parameter so that some goal
is met asymptotically. The main concept used is to show that noise effects average
out so that the actual behaviour is determined by that of a ‘mean’ ordinary differen-
tial equation (ODE). This has been applied in diverse areas, in particular in signal
processing and communications.
In the stochastic approximation framework, our discounting corresponds to a con-
stant step size parameter. This class of algorithms has been developed to allow for
tracking changing parameters. The type of results is that the process spends nearly
all of its time in a neighbourhood of the limit point or set. The size of the neigh-
bourhood depends on the constant step size. Thus, results are of weak convergence
type (i.e. convergence in distribution).
We will now study the deterministic mean ODE. Instead of showing that the process
Rn is governed by it, we will then compute the distribution of Rn explicitly (cf.
Section 5) and thus show that the process behaves as predicted from the ODE.
From (3), averaging the dynamics in the stochastic approximation form, we obtain
the following ODE.
˙R(t) = (1− ρ)[pθ − pR(t)− (1− p)R(t)1{R(t)≤∆}] (5)
Note that the ODE is discontinuous in R(t). We can solve this separately for R(t) ≤
∆ and R(t) > ∆ to obtain the solution
R(t) =


(r0 − pθ)e
−(1−ρ)t + pθ if R(t) ≤ ∆
(r0 − θ)e
−p(1−ρ)t + θ if R(t) > ∆ .
(6)
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Thus there are two possible solutions: θ and pθ, the zero drift values from the
previous section which have also been obtained by means of averaging. In addition,
we can now assess stability of the deterministic system.
The condition for θ to be a solution is θ > ∆. The condition for pθ to be a solution
is pθ ≤ ∆. Both are globally asymptotically stable on their respective region. If
only one exists then the trajectories in the other region also converge to it. So all
trajectories converge to the solution and in this sense it is globally asymptotically
stable for the whole system. Note that usually one would take global stability
to imply smoothness. This is not the case here. Otherwise, both are globally
asymptotically stable on their respective region only and in this sense, they are
both locally stable overall.
Theorem 1 If θ > ∆, then R = θ is a solution of the mean ODE (5). For λ <
λc = (θ − ∆)/∆ it is globally asymptotically stable (in the sense explained above).
Otherwise, there exists a second, false solution R = pθ and both are locally stable.
If θ ≤ ∆ then the latter, false one is globally asymptotically stable.
Assuming ∆ < θ, the reputation system exhibits a phase transition behaviour. In
the subcritical regime, that is, for lying rates below the non-zero critical value λc,
the true reputation value θ is the unique solution. In the supercritical regime where
the lying rate is above the critical rate there is a second, false value.
In practical terms, this suggests that the reputation system works and that the liar
cannot achieve anything if ∆ < θ and λ < λc. However, the liar does have an impact
otherwise.
As for the latter condition, it is intuitively clear that the deviation test can filter
out extreme lies only if they do not occur too often. As for the former condition,
it is clear that if the true θ is too close to the extreme 0 behaviour, the deviation
test will not filter out the lies and the liar will have an impact. In conclusion, the
deviation test cannot protect a ‘very bad’ subject behaviour to be pushed by the
liar to an ‘extremely bad’ perception by the honest user. However, there is a range
of parameters for which the deviation test does protect the reputation system.
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As mentioned in Section 3.1, the analysis can be repeated symmetrically to show
that the reputation system protects against extremely positive reports rather than
extremely negative ones. Combining the two, we obtain the following conditions
for the true solution to be unique if both, positive and negative lying is permitted:
min{θ, 1− θ} > ∆ and λ < (min{θ, 1− θ} −∆) /∆.
5 Distribution of Rn
Given R0 we can compute the distribution of Rn analytically. We will use this now
to confirm the mean-field predictions from the previous section.
The state space of our process is complicated and large, making the theoretical
study hard and direct computation infeasible. So, instead we compute the exact
distribution of Rn for a finite state space. For a real-world reputation system we
are interested in considering only finitely many states anyway, as it is not possible
to store arbitrary precision values on a finite device. Alternatively, the process can
be simulated, but the explicit computation of the distribution is more powerful.
The results below are obtained when the unit interval is split into G = 1000 boxes
of size g = 0.001 each. We first compute the transition matrix for the 1000 state
chain. Then, with starting value r0, we repeatedly compute the distribution at the
next step until this remains unchanged (in double precision, i.e. 64 bits, i.e. to
sixteen significant digits). This suggests that we have converged.
In fact, taking the midpoint of intervals as the corresponding state gives rise to
very non-smooth distributions due to approximation errors which do not seem to
go away with increasing grid size G. So, instead, we choose the corresponding state
uniformly from the interval. This amounts to the following: Let x denote the left
endpoint of the interval, then the right one is x + g. The possible new states from
x are ρx + (1 − ρ), ρx and x. The ones from x + g are ρx + (1 − ρ) + ρg, ρx + ρg
and x+ g which differ from the previous one by at most g. All other states that can
be reached from within the interval lie in between due to monotonicity. Thus the
new states lie in at most two neighbouring intervals. We split the probability flow
into these two intervals according to the proportions corresponding to a uniform
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distribution over the interval rather than a point mass in the middle. The effect of
this is demonstrated in Figure 1, where we plot a typical distribution first with a
point mass and then with a uniform distribution.
The graphs in Figure 2 show the distributions obtained for θ = 0.8, ∆ = 0.4,
ρ = 0.99, r0 = 0.4 (= ∆), a typical set of parameters, and various values of p. Thus,
from the previous section, the predicted critical value is λc = (θ−∆)/∆ = 1, that is
pc = ∆/θ = 0.5. Since some of the values are smaller by several orders of magnitude
than others, the features are obscured. So we also plot them in log-scale in Figure
3.
From the log-scale plots in Figure 3 we note that the distribution is unimodal for
p > pc = 0.5 with a mode at θ = 0.8. It is bimodal for p < 0.5 with a second mode
at a lower value pθ, i.e. at 0.16 and 0.32 respectively. This is all as predicted from
the previous section. In fact, consulting the output for p = 0.45 and 0.55, we find
that the predicted critical value of pc = 0.5 is confirmed further. Moreover, with
a different choice of parameters the prediction of only one mode at pθ for the case
θ ≤ ∆ can also be confirmed.
In addition, the graphs in Figure 2 give us good idea of the total mass near the
false pθ compared to the total mass near the true θ. The latter decreases in the
lying rate. Still, even for p = 0.2, the process is more likely to be right than wrong
asymptotically. Only for very small p it becomes significant.
The lightly coloured distributions in Figure 2 are obtained for a different choice
of ρ = 0.9. The discount factor controls the variability around the solutions. The
further it is from 1, the less the probability mass is concentrated near these values. In
the supercritical case, if there was no discounting, we would converge to one value
or the other with certain probabilities and then remain there forever. However,
with the discounting, this does not happen. There is always a small but positive
probability of moving from one solution to the other. The proportion of the time the
process spends around the true solution corresponds to the probability of converging
to the true solution in the case of no discounting.
So far, with the parameter set above, we have only considered the case r0 = ∆.
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However, the corresponding distributions obtained for the two extreme cases r0 = 0
and r0 = 1 are essentially the same as the ones for r0 = ∆ = 0.4. This is shown in
Figure 4. For p = 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 they agree at least to within 10−14 for each state.
For p = 0.2 they differ, however, distributions had not converged fully here before
the computations were stopped after 5 × 106 iterations. We expect them to agree
when computations are allowed to run until completion.
This suggests that the process is independent of its initial state, which is as expected
for a unique attractor. Moreover, if there are two attractors, there is positive proba-
bility of moving from one to the other for all times and we start in a fully converged
state. Thus, in this case, too, the initial state should not matter.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We have seen that the reputation system exhibits a phase transition. Via a mean-
field approach, we have derived a closed form expression for the critical lying rate
λc. We have verified the mean-field results by direct computation.
In the subcritical regime, when the lying rate is sufficiently small, the liar has no
impact on the honest user. In the supercritical regime, the liar does have an impact.
Thus we can give precise conditions under which the deviation test makes the rep-
utation system robust. We can further predict the false reputation value and with
what probability this will be obtained rather than the true value in the supercritical
regime.
The reputation system will be most robust against lying if ∆ is chosen very small. We
have quantified the effect on the robustness due to a change in ∆. This is important
for the fundamental trade-off, because smaller ∆ means less use of second hand
information. We have been interested in a system that is as fast a possible subject
to being accurate. In practical terms, we have seen that there is a reasonable range
of parameters for which the deviation test will protect the reputation systems from
liars.
Given a cost function with arbitrary weights on accuracy and speed, we could com-
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pute the optimal choice of the system parameter ∆. One might also want to think
about individually controlled ∆i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , based on the users’ current infor-
mation.
We have illustrated the effect of the discount parameter. The closer it is to 1, the
more accurate the process can estimate the parameter. However, it takes longer to
track changing behaviour.
The scenario of two peers that we have considered thus far can also be viewed
as an extreme case. Even if all other users are malicious so that all second hand
information is manipulated, the reputation systems protects against the lying if
the aggregate lying rate is below a threshold. In a real-world scenario one would
typically be able to assume that at least some if not most users are honest. To
examine this in more detail, the next step is to consider the case of three peers: one
honest user making direct observations at rate µ = 1, indirect ones originating from
the liar at rate λ > 0 and indirect ones originating from the honest peer at rate
ν > 0.
We have assumed independent subject behaviour. It might be interesting to consider
the case when direct observations are correlated.
The next extension is then to consider strategic lying. This deals with the case
when adversaries do not simply lie maximally, but attempt something more subtle.
It would also be interesting to consider random noise instead of fake reports. This
would model random failures in components or transmission.
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Figure 1: Effect of smoothing for θ = 0.8, ∆ = 0.4, ρ = 0.99, r0 = 0.4. The
distribution in the top graph has been obtained with a point mass, the bottom one
with a uniform distribution.
17
Figure 2: Distribution of Rn for p = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 respectively. The lightly
coloured graphs are obtained when ρ = 0.99 is replaced by ρ = 0.9.
18
Figure 3: Log-scale plots of the distributions shown in Figure 2. There are two
modes for p = 0.2 and 0.4 and there is only one for p = 0.6 and 0.8.
19
Figure 4: Log-scale plots with r0 = 0.4 as in Figure 3 (medium) together with the
corresponding distribution for r0 = 1 (dark) and r0 = 0 (light). They coincide
except in the first plot for p = 0.2 where they are still close.
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θ probability of positive subject behaviour Section 3.1
µ direct observation rate of honest user Section 3.1
λ indirect observation rate of honest user, i.e. lying rate Section 3.1
p probability of an observation being direct Section 3.1
Rn reputation value of honest user after n
th interaction Section 3.2
r0 initial reputation value Section 3.2
∆ deviation test parameter Section 3.1
ω weighting factor attached to indirect observations Section 3.2
ρ discount factor Section 3.2
Table 1: Notation
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